Indicators of Risks to Media Pluralism

Why? 

The Television market is monitored by the ‘Kommission zur Ermittlung der Konzentration im Medienbereich (KEK)’ which is a joint commission of the several State-based regulatory authorities. MOM used the audience data from AGF Videoforschung for 2023. The channels of the Public Broadcasters, ProSiebenSat1 (Berlusconi Family and Renata Kellnerova) and RTL Group (the Mohn Family through Bertelsmann Foundation) reach an audience share of 75.3% which is indicative of a high risk of concentration. However, it has to be noted that the Public Broadcasting system in Germany is decentralised and that can be considered as a mitigating factor. On the other hand, no transparent mechanisms exist to assess the internal pluralism within the public media space, which is an additional risk – even more so given its market dominance in both radio and TV. While German public media consists, technically, of several entities, a significant amount of content is co-produced, re-broadcast, shared or syndicated. Recently, public broadcasters have announced cost-cutting measures to further centralise their operations and output.

Radio: 66%

The audience of the Radio market is calculated by Arbeitsgemeinschaft Media-Analyse e.V. (agma), an association of media companies and agencies. The MOM Sample makes up 35.70% of the total audience share in the radio market. The dominant players in the radio market are  Public broadcasters, in MOM sample, 7 out of 10 media outlets are run by various Public broadcasters which alone make up 70% of the MOM sample. The remaining three media outlets privately run have very complex ownership structures with the participation of the all major media companies such as Axel Springer, Bertelsmann, Madsack media group, Funke media group and even Social Democratic Party and its difficult to attribute control to one specific owner. In July 2024 there were around 330 private and 74 public radio stations in Germany, according to agma. However, it looks like most of the popular private radio stations have very complex ownership structures which make it difficult to calculate audience concentration. However, based on ma agma 2024, radio stations that are collectively owned by RTL Group, Hubert Burda Media, Axel Springer, Madsack Media Group, Medien Union, Funke Media Group and others cumulatively have an audience share of at least 30%, these companies also run their own radio stations where they have controlling stake. While it is clear that the German public prefers local public radio stations, only a handful of owners control the most popular radio stations in the country, amounting to potentially 80% of audience share, which is indicative of high risk of concentration. At the same time, it needs to be highlighted that the broadcasting system is rather decentralised, which can be considered a mitigating factor in the risk of control over the radio market. Similar to the TV market it needs to be emphasised that no transparent mechanism exists to assess the internal pluralism within the public media space, which is an additional risk – even more so given its market dominance in both radio and TV. While German public media  consists, technically, of several entities, a significant amount of content is co-produced, re-broadcast, shared or syndicated. Recently, public broadcasters have announced cost-cutting measures to reduce their number of radio channels, to further centralise their operations and output.

Furthermore, in KEK’s most recent Concentration report of 2022, the commission reports that concentration in the radio market remains low, that no broadcaster reaches the critical audience share. Based on the report the Public Broadcasters reach an audience share of 51.8% and the top 3 private players are Regiocast (5.9%) RTL Group (4.8%) and Müller Medien (3.5%). So the top 4 in 2022 reached 66% of audience share. 

Print: 63.54%

The audience of the Print market in Germany is calculated by Arbeitsgemeinschaft Media-Analyse e.V. (agma), an association of media companies and agencies. It produces yearly surveys, i.e. Media-Analyse for online, print and radio markets. For print the data is provided separately for daily newspapers and magazines (weekly, monthly, bimonthly, quarterly). The MOM sample included 4 daily and 6 weekly newspapers. The MOM team also used data on average sold copies per issue collected by ‘Informationsgemeinschaft zur Feststellung der Verbreitung von Werbeträgern e.V.’ (IVW) for the 4th quarter of 2023. 

Print in Germany is consumed locally; only 6 daily newspapers (Bild, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Handelsblatt, Süddeutsche Zeitung, taz, Die Welt) are distributed across the entire country. The German market distinguishes between ‘regionale’, ‘überregionale’ and ‘lokale’ newspapers (regional, uber-regional and local). Some of the regional newspapers such as Die Rheinpfalz are published only in regions of Rhineland-Palatinate, yet have a reach of 48.30% in that region. When looking at the number of publishers operating across the country, the German print market looks overwhelmingly diverse with a multitude of regionally active companies. However, looking at regions one-by-one, high concentration can be identified. Similarly, if we look at publications available nationwide, we find only a handful of publishers. This constellation makes it hard to clearly define the risk score of the print market. Based on the MOM Methodology we focus on media with national reach, and as such, we define the relevant market as the top 25 publishers/titles based on sold copies and those include national as well as regional publishers. Based on the calculations of sold copies of top 25 titles we have established a high risk of concentration in the print market with the top 4 publishers reaching an audience share of 63.54%. It’s important to note that these publishers operate many more publications that were not included in the calculations, either because they had a limited geographical reach / focus or due to lack of data on their audience shares (especially in cases of local publications of Ippen, Madsack, Funke groups).  

TOP 4 based on ma agma 2024: 70.85%

The risk of concentration appears high when calculations are based on sold copies, with top 4 companies reaching a share of 63.54% 

TOP 4 based on IVW: 63.54%

Online: below 25%

Online market:  The MOM sample  of 11 media outlets make up only 18.93 percent of the online market. The online market is rather difficult to measure, partly because the MOM Sample is composed of two sets of data, both of which have their own limitations. The one from IVW excludes the public sector and Similar Web includes sites such as tagesschau.de. Still, the available data implies that the share of the four biggest players (United Internet, Burda, Axel Springer and Ströer) is well below 50 or even 25 percent – even if we consider that they operate numerous other online media outside of the MOM Sample. The risk of concentration in the online market therefore is assessed as low. 

SOURCES:

Television Audience Measurement, KEK 2023
Radio Audience Data, ma agma 2024
Print data on sold copies, Top printtiteln Auflagen, Q4, 2023, IVW
Online Audience Data, KEK 2024

Why? 

TV: Although the Statistical Business Register (Unternehmensregister) provides financial information on revenues, no financial information is available on specific horizontal markets, such as online, print and radio, therefore ownership concentration in horizontal markets cannot be computed. The revenue data is consistently available for Television market however when calculated in the news relevant TV market the top 3, comprised of 4 public broadcasters (BR, NDR, SWR, WDR), RTL Group (Bertelsmann) and ProSieben-Sat1, have nearly 79% of market share.  

In accordance with the MOM methodology if the country presents data on audience, but not on revenues/market share: the market share data is excluded from the analysis, i.e., the findings are based on the audience data alone and the revenue data are considered optional.

SOURCES:

Commercial register of Germany (Handeslregister)

Why?

The constitutional requirements are taken up in the Interstate Media Treaty. Among other matters, this also regulates media concentration law for private providers of nationwide television channels. According to Section 60 (1) of the Interstate Media Treaty, television broadcasters may offer any number of channels unless they thereby acquire a dominant influence on public opinion. This is presumed to be the case if a provider and the programs attributable to it achieve an audience share of 30% or more, calculated as an annual average ("audience share model"). The presumption of dominant position also exists if the audience share is below 30%, but the company has a dominant position on a related market or an overall assessment of its television and related market activities shows that its influence on opinion is comparable to that of a company with a 30% audience share. A bonus regulation allows percentage points to be deducted from the relevant audience share if regional window programs (2%) or broadcasting times for independent third parties (3%) are offered. Thresholds for ownership in the radio market are clearly defined in the media treaties of the Länder. 

The aim of antitrust law is to ensure free economic competition and prevent the abuse of economic power. The relevant regulations can be found in the Act against Restraints of Competition (GWB). Because journalistic media are not only sources of information, but also economic goods, they are (also) subject to the ARC. Although antitrust law indirectly contributes to ensuring the diversity of providers, the Federal Constitutional Court recognizes that the sole application of merger control is not sufficient to ensure diversity of opinion in broadcasting and to prevent predominant power of opinion. 

Antitrust law pursues different objectives than media concentration law and is much more limited in its scope of application. In the area of broadcasting, merger control pursuant to Sections 35 et seq. GWB only applies to mergers of broadcasting companies, but not to the establishment of broadcasting companies by individual companies that already have a strong or even dominant market position in other areas. Internal growth also does not fall within the scope of application of antitrust law. However, if this leads to predominant power of opinion, it is covered in accordance with Section 60 MStV.

However, a mere restriction of economic power in the area of private broadcasting or media companies through antitrust law does not necessarily guarantee the diversity of opinion required by the constitution. Changes in shareholdings in the media sector can be permissible under antitrust law, but can still lead to the formation of dominant power of opinion, for example through cross-media effects. Conversely, cooperation between companies can be problematic under antitrust law, although they may be permitted or even politically desirable in terms of ensuring diversity, for example to ensure the journalistic coverage of a region.

The safeguarding of diversity of opinion places a particular focus on the broadcasting sector. While press companies are subject to media concentration regulations in conjunction with broadcasting companies, press mergers are mainly controlled on the basis of antitrust law. These latter, while not media-specific, can be considered effective, as exemplified by a prominent case in 2021. The German Federal Cartel Office prohibited the acquisition of full control over the publishing companies of the "Ostthüringer Zeitung" by Funke Mediengruppe. Funke Mediengruppe is the publisher of the "Thüringische Landeszeitung", whose circulation area partly coincides with that of the "Ostthüringer Zeitung". As a result of the planned merger, which has now been prohibited, both the "Ostthüringer Zeitung" and the "Thüringische Landeszeitung" would have been under the exclusive control of the Funke Mediengruppe.

Traditional concentration control does not take place in the online sector (media intermediaries, platforms and user interfaces), although it is increasingly considered a problem. Online news media can be considered “neighbouring markets”, and minimal protections exist. In a leading media law decision from 2018, the Federal Constitutional Court stated: "The digitalization of the media and, in particular, the network and platform economy of the Internet, including social networks, favour - on the contrary - concentration and monopolization tendencies among providers, distributors and intermediaries of content."

Regulatory Safeguard Score:

Score 17 out of 20 = 85% (Low Risk) 

1 = media-specific regulation/ authority

0.5 = competition-related regulation/ authority 

 SOURCES:

Legal Assessment MOM Germany 2024

Why?

MOM Germany database consists of 41 media outlets that are operated by 24 companies of which 6 are public broadcasting entities and are funded by a fee levied on a monthly basis on every household. The TOP8 companies have a market share of 95.60%, which is indicative of high risk of concentration. The top 8 are active across all markets with the exception of the public broadcasting companies which are present mostly in TV, Radio and Online.

The companies such as Bertelsmann and United Internet have significantly bigger revenues and likely most of those do not come from their media activities, hence we have also calculated the market without their other revenues and focused on the revenues of the companies that are directly related to their online media, or broadcast and publishing activities (RTL group and 1&1 Media respectively). But even if those revenues are removed the risk of concentration remains high with 93.41%, yet the top 8 slightly changes. 

The annual revenues for three companies were not available: Ippen Group, Antenne Bayern and Regiocast. Ippen Group is an informal group of myriad of companies and hence their revenues were not available. Antenne Bayern and Regiocast on the other hand have shareholder structures which are subject to limited disclosure requirements, so that no annual financial statements are published (Section 264a of the German Commercial Code (HGB)). The companies did not respond to a corresponding request.

SOURCES:

Commercial register of Germany (Handelsregister)

Why?

The regulatory safeguards for cross-media concentration are relatively strong in Germany, but they are focused on traditional sectors and do not sufficiently consider new forms of media.While thresholds exist, they are not clearly defined for sectors other than television. The Federal Constitutional Court calls on legislators to prevent the risk of "concentration of opinion power". According to the court, this arises when "opinion leaders who have broadcasting frequencies and financial resources at their disposal are significantly involved in shaping public opinion". According to Section 60 (2) MStV, dominant power of opinion is presumed if a provider and the programs attributable to it achieve an audience share of 30% or more, calculated as an annual average. The presumption of dominant power of opinion also exists if the audience share is below 30%, but the company has a dominant position on a related market or an overall assessment of its television and related market activities shows that its influence on opinion is comparable to that of a company with a 30% audience share.  

A protocol declaration to the 2020 Interstate Media Treaty states: "The federal states are committed to a sustainable media concentration law. This must be able to effectively counter the real threats to diversity of opinion. The media markets have opened up in recent years, bringing other media genres in addition to television, the possible consequences of cross-media mergers and also those on upstream and downstream markets increasingly into focus. A reformed media concentration law must therefore take all media-relevant markets into consideration."

The Commission on Concentration in the Media (KEK) is responsible for ensuring diversity of opinion in private television at a national level. In terms of uniform concentration control, it acts as a decision-making body and mediating authority for all state media authorities in this area. Its decisions are binding. The Federal Cartel Office is also active in the media market and can use its sanctioning power (which means the blocking of mergers).

The KEK publishes a media concentration report every three years, which deals with the development of concentration in private broadcasting and measures to ensure diversity of opinion. Current overviews of programs, audience shares, media-relevant related markets and company profiles are available on the KEK website, and all decisions of the Commission are published promptly. The KEK's media database contains information on company holdings in the areas of television, radio, press and online media.

In 2006, the KEK rejected the takeover of ProSiebenSat.1 Media AG by Axel Springer AG. The KEK justified this with ProSiebenSat.1's strong position in nationwide private television. In combination with Axel Springer AG's dominant position in the daily press, this would, in the opinion of the KEK, lead to a predominant power of opinion. According to the audience share model, this would result in an influence on opinion that would correspond to an audience share of over 42 percent in nationwide television. The KEK had offered to forego the acquisition of a station (Sat.1 or ProSieben) or to make the stations plural within Germany. The Federal Cartel Office also had reservations about the merger plans.

Regulatory Safeguards Score: 7 out of 8 (Regulation: 87.5%)

SOURCES:

Legal Assessment MOM Germany 2024

Why? 

Ownership structures of all registered legal entities in Germany are available at the commercial registers of all cities free of charge. Commission for Concentration Control (KEK) also provides detailed ownership data on all media companies. 

The MOM Sample comprises 41 media outlets, 24 media companies and 25 individual owners, one of whom is the Public, 1 is a political party and 1 a legal entity representing the employees of a company. In addition to desk research MOM contacted media outlets to invite them to proactively participate in the project; based on their response and availability of data every outlet, company and owner are ranked by transparency. 

Active Transparency means company/channel informs proactively and comprehensively about its ownership, data is constantly updated and easily verifiable. 30 outlets,16 companies and 14 owners were ranked as Actively Transparent, i.e. 66.6 % of the entire sample.  

Passive Transparency means upon request, ownership data is easily available from the company/channel. 3 outlets, 2 companies and 1 owner were ranked as Passively Transparent, i.e. 6.67 % of the entire sample. Most of these companies, outlets and owners are related to the media that provided detailed replies to MOM information requests. 

Data Publicly Available means ownership data is easily available from other sources, e. g. public registries etc. 8 outlets, 6 companies and 10 owners were ranked as Data Publicly Available, i.e. even if the websites didn’t inform them publicly of the owners those could be found in the public records, this transparency ranking was used in 26,67% of cases.   

MOM Information requests were sent out by registered mail and email on April 19, 2024, reminder emails were sent out on May 22, 2024. 11 companies have provided detailed replies to our requests in written form or by email. These companies are: Antenne Bayern GmbH & Co. KG, ARD, Bayerischer Rundfunk, Hubert Burda Media Holding KG, MADSACK Mediengruppe, Norddeutscher Rundfunk, Rheinische Post Mediengruppe GmbH, RTL Deutschland, SPIEGEL-Verlag Rudolf Augstein GmbH & Co. KG, Ströer SE & Co KG aA and Südwestdeutscher Rundfunk.

Why?

As part of the licensing procedure, broadcasters of nationwide television must submit extensive documentation in accordance with the Interstate Media Treaty (§ 55 MStV, see below for details). The state media authorities also have extensive rights to information and powers of investigation in this regard (§ 56 MStV). The state media authorities must be notified of any changes. 

In contrast, print and online media in Germany are not always covered by media-specific laws, as not all of the 16 state press laws contain provisions on the disclosure of ownership. Still, as a mitigating factor, the commercial register includes relevant information about the companies publishing media, and according to the Telemedia Act and the state press laws, publishers are required to provide general information about themselves in their “impressum” (imprint) section. Due to these limitations, we can identify some limitations to determine the ownership structure of print media in all federal states. In this context, a lot depends on the specific legal form of the company and differs from other company forms in the case of listed companies. All state media laws contain regulations to avoid "double monopolies" and restrict overlaps between press and broadcasting. Potential shareholdings in other media can oblige publishers to disclose their ownership structure in the event of planned mergers.

The transparency obligations under media law apply to nationwide broadcasting (TV and radio). However, there are hardly any nationwide radio stations, so in practice it is mainly TV companies that are subject to this obligation.

The submission obligation includes in particular (1.) the disclosure of direct and indirect shareholdings as well as the capital and voting rights relationships in this and the associated companies in accordance with the German Stock Corporation Act, (2.) the disclosure of relatives among the participants and representatives of the person or partnership or members of a body of a legal entity, (3.) the provision of the articles of association and the provisions of the applicant's articles of association, (4.) the disclosure of agreements between the direct or indirect participants relating to the joint organization of broadcasting as well as to fiduciary relationships and relevant relationships.

Pursuant to § 63 MStV, broadcasters and the parties involved in them must generally notify any planned changes in shareholdings prior to their implementation. However, there is an exception to this notification obligation for minor changes in shareholdings or other influences that are regulated by the KEK's de minimis guideline for notification obligations (notification obligation guideline). This guideline applies to broadcasters and participants of all company forms. The acquisition or sale of less than 5 percent of the capital or voting rights of a company is deemed to be a de minimis threshold. However, minor changes in shareholdings remain subject to notification if (1.) the shareholding thresholds of 25%, 50% or 75% are reached, exceeded or fallen below, (2.) an increase or decrease of at least 5% in a previously notified shareholding is brought about by one or more successive transactions, or (3.) a shareholding in a listed stock corporation reaches or exceeds 5% and exceeding this threshold has not already been the subject of a notification within a preceding period of 12 months.

Regulatory Safeguard Score:

15 out of 20 – Low Risk (75%) 

SOURCES:

Legal Assessment MOM Germany 2024

Why?

8.1 None of the Television channels in the MOM sample are owned or controlled by a political party, politician or a political grouping. Nevertheless the family of the former Italian president Berlusconi owns 13.3% of the shares of ProSiebenSat.1 Media. The stations of the group have an audience share of 11.7%. Several of the public broadcasting television channels have representatives from political parties in their supervisory committees, but remain politically neutral.

8.2 None of the radio stations are directly owned or controlled by a political party, politician or political grouping. Nevertheless the social democratic party (SPD) through ddvg (Deutsche Druck- und Verlagsgesellschaft mbH) has minor shares below 1% in Antenne Bayern, Radio NRW, and Radio Bob (4.1%). Through their shares in Regiocast they are shareholders in many other radio stations that are subsidiaries of Regiocast. Several of  the public broadcasting radio stations have representatives from parties in their supervisory committees, but remain politically neutral.

8.3 The social democratic party SPD is with 23.1% the largest individual shareholder in the Madsack media group, which owns several regional newspapers outside of the MOM sample and the Redaktionsnetzwerk Deutschland (RND). RND provides content for Madsack owned and external regional newspapers. 

8.4 The social democratic party SPD is with 23.1% the largest individual shareholder in the Madsack media group, which owns RND.de. Their audience share is below 1%. 

8.5 No German media is fully controlled by a political party, politician or a political grouping. Nevertheless SPD has 23.1% of the shares of Madsack media group. Madsack is not sufficiently transparent about its ownership structure on its website, nor is it transparent about the political affiliations of its shareholders. Due to German laws, the information about the shareholders of Madsack group are available in the commercial register. The SPD holds its shares through the ddvg media group, which is listed as such in the commercial register. Hence theSPD stake in the Madsack media group is not so readily apparent. It has to be noted that the Madsack media group is also invested in a number of regional and local newspapers and radio stations. ProSiebenSat.1 is transparent about their owners and their shareholder MediaForEurope, which is controlled by the family of the former Italian president Berlusconi. The family’s political activities have no bearing on the German political scene. 

The political affiliations of Supervisory Board members governing the public media entities has been publicly criticised and even become a subject of rulings of the highest courts in order to impose limitations. While there has been some progress over the past years to curb the influence of party-affiliated appointments, they are still present in the governance of public media, and not all of them are transparently disclosed.

8.6 Politically exposed persons (PEP) have to be mentioned in the transparency register. Nevertheless it’s not forbidden for them to be shareholders or in the management of media companies.

8.7 The independence of editorial offices from shareholders or political influence is generally guaranteed. 

8.8 The most influential commercial media are signatories of the press code of the Presserat (Press Council) or at least the support the independence of editorial teams. It is noteworthy that the dominant public media sector subscribes to broad principles, but has no codified editorial guidelines against which it can be held accountable.

Score: 11/8=1.37 Low Risk


Die Mediatheke: Die Mär vom politisch unabhängigen ZDF Holger Kreymeier, Medien Insider (2024), Accessed on 10 September 2024
Der politisch völlig unabhängige ZDF-FERNSEHRAT Massengeschmack-TV, Youtube (2024), Accessed on 10 September 2024

Why?

9.1 The print infrastructure in Germany is owned in most cases by the publishers of newspapers. In some cases the political party SPD owns shares of those publishers through their holding company ddvg, but there’s no evidence of political interference. 

9.2 In Germany, radio broadcasting licences are issued by the state media authorities (Landesmedienanstalten). These 14 independent regulatory bodies grant licences to private broadcasters in their respective federal states, based on criteria outlined in the Interstate Media Treaty and state media laws. Applicants must meet specific requirements, including legal capacity and compliance with broadcasting regulations, while the authorities assess factors such as technical requirements, coverage area, and public interest in the licensing process.

9.3 Cable networks for TV transmission in Germany are primarily owned by Vodafone, which dominates the market after acquiring Kabel Deutschland in 2015 and Unitymedia in 2019. Other significant cable network operators include Tele Columbus (with its brand PYUR) and various regional and local providers. Originally owned by Deutsche Bundespost and later Deutsche Telekom, the cable networks were divested around the turn of the millennium due to antitrust regulations, leading to the current market distribution.

9.4 The biggest providers of internet in Germany are Deutsche Telekom, Vodafone and Telefónica. The German state owns 27.8% of Deutsche Telekom. Nevertheless there is no evidence of political influence on the internet networks in Germany.

9.5 The advertising industry is owned by private media companies or by subsidiaries of public broadcasters. There is no evidence of discriminatory action.

9.6 The audience measurement services are open to any media outlets that pay for the services. There is no evidence of discriminatory action. 

Score: 1 Low Risk

Why?

10.1-10.2 There are no specific legal regulations in Germany. Rather, this area is left to general public procurement law. Public procurement law binds public authorities to the principle of transparency and is regulated in Section 97 I GWB. It stipulates that contracting authorities must ensure appropriate publicity in award procedures. The transparency requirement obliges contracting authorities to publicize the upcoming award of a contract in such a way that interested companies are given the opportunity to apply for the tendered contract. The government refrains from advertising directly in the media. Instead, advertising budgets are allocated to advertising agencies, which take responsibility for how the advertising is disseminated via various channels such as billboards, newspaper advertisements, online platforms, etc. There are no reports from NGOs about non-transparent advertising allocations and there are no press publications on this topic.

10.3-10.6 There is no information on how much the share of advertising by the state is compared to all advertising revenues. Nevertheless there is no evidence that the state’ advertising budget has a significant influence on media companies. 

10.7-10.8 The state does not support media companies financially, although there are discussions about supporting print newspapers due to digitalisation. There is also no evidence for indirect financial support, except for the VAT reduction for journalistic products like newspapers and online news subscriptions.

10.9 Germany has no state financed news agency.

10.10 The public broadcasting fee is paid by all households to fund public broadcasting services. Its amount is determined by an independent commission (KEF) that assesses the financial needs of public broadcasters, with the final decision made by the heads of government of the 16 German federal states and ratified by their parliaments. The overall budget is around 9 billion Euros and has a significant impact on private media companies in terms of salaries and level playing field.

10.11 The management of public broadcasters is elected by their supervisory boards independently. However, the supervisory boards are not free of political affiliations and may have politicians or members of political parties present. The – open or hidden – political affiliations of Supervisory Board members governing the public media entities has been publicly criticised and even become a subject of rulings of the highest courts in order to impose limitations. While there has been some progress over the past years to curb the influence of party-affiliated appointments, they are still present in the governance of public media, and not all of them are transparently disclosed. This also relates to politically aligned so-called ‘Freundeskreise’ (circles of friends) within those supervisory bodies.

Score: 13/9= 1.44 Low Risk

Die Mediatheke: Die Mär vom politisch unabhängigen ZDF Holger Kreymeier, Medien Insider (2024), Accessed on 10 September 2024
Der politisch völlig unabhängige ZDF-FERNSEHRAT Massengeschmack-TV, Youtube (2024), Accessed on 10 September 2024
Legal Assessment MOM Germany 2024

Why?

With the "TSM Regulation", the European legislator has enshrined net neutrality and the best-effort principle in law. Net neutrality within the meaning of the TSM Regulation exists if the internet access provider treats all traffic in a network equally (i.e. neutrally) regardless of content, application, service, sender and recipient. There are few exceptions to this principle. Supervision is carried out by the Federal Network Agency.

The Federal Network Agency has the power to issue orders to ensure compliance with the provisions of Regulation (EU) 2015/2120 and to enforce them by means of a penalty payment if necessary. It can also impose fines for certain violations of the net neutrality regulations. The Telecommunications Modernization Act, which came into force on 1 December 2021, raised the maximum fine for particularly serious violations to EUR 1 million. 

The principles of net neutrality impose certain obligations on internet access services. In principle, these services may not block, slow down or otherwise treat content on the internet unequally. Any form of blocking on the internet, such as DNS, IP or URL blocking, is therefore in principle a violation of net neutrality.

The network operators have taken measures to ensure the smooth operation of the networks. If necessary, they can use approved traffic management measures in accordance with the Network Neutrality Ordinance. The Federal Network Agency has developed guidelines for the telecommunications industry with solutions and measures for appropriate traffic management. Overall, the national regulatory authorities have sufficient regulatory instruments at their disposal to respond adequately to such crisis situations. The close cooperation of all parties involved - including regulatory authorities, BEREC, companies, national authorities and the European Commission - was crucial in ensuring that the communication networks continued to function reliably even under the conditions of Covid-19.

On April 28, 2022, decisions were made by the Federal Network Agency regarding the zero-rating offer "StreamOn" from Telekom Deutschland GmbH and the "Vodafone Pass". The marketing of these add-on options was prohibited and the termination of existing customer contracts was ordered. These measures were taken following a ruling by the European Court of Justice on September 2, 2021, which stated that such zero-rating offers contradict the principle of equal treatment of data traffic. The Court prohibits both technical and tariff-based unequal treatment between different types of traffic within a tariff. Zero-rating options treat data traffic unequally in that certain services and applications are not counted towards the data allowance and can therefore be used indefinitely.

Regulatory Safeguards score: 11 out 11 = 100% (Low Risk)

Legal Assessment MOM Germany 2024

Why?

12.1 Few German media companies have implemented official gender quotas. The newspaper taz stands out with a quota system since the 1980s, resulting in the highest female power share (65.1%) among German leading media. Most major media companies in Germany have not established binding quotas.

12.2 Both male and female journalists in Germany face increasing online threats and harassment. In 2022, Germany recorded 87 attacks against journalists, indicating a concerning trend of violence against media professionals, although gender-specific data is not available. 

Score: 18/7=2.57 High Risk